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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/ Respondent
Case No. 20060281-SC

vs.
RANDY SHEA GARDNER,
Defendant / Petitioner

JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH SUPREME COURT
This Court has appellate jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to the
provisions of Utah Code Annotated §§ 78-2-2(3)(a) and 78-2a-4.

ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
Whether due process necessitated review of the cross-examination
testimony of one of the State's witnesses], where Petitioner claimed entrapment,
the recorded transcript does not include the cross-examination testimony, and the
court of appeals did not address the district court's proposed reconstruction of that
testimony.
On certiorari review, this Court examines the decision of the court of
appeals for correctness. State v. Brake, 2004 UT 95, f 11, 103 P.3d 699.

1

CONTROLLING STATUTORY PROVISIONS
All relevant statutory provisions are set forth in the Addenda of the
Petitioner's Brief.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case
The Defendant and Petitioner, Randy Shea Gardner, appeals from the

decision of the Utah Court of Appeals affirming his conviction by a jury in Third
District Court for Distribution, Offering, Agreeing, Consent or Arranging to
Distribute a Controlled Substance (Metharnphetamine), a second degree felony,

B.

Lower Court Proceedings and Disposition
Gardner was charged by Information with two (2) counts of Distribution,

Offering, Agreement, Consenting or Arranging to Distribute a Controlled or
Counterfeit Substance, a Second Degree Felony, at Utah State Prison, in violation
of Utah Code Ann. 58-37-8(l)(a)(ii) (R. 1-3). A Preliminary Hearing was held on
April 2, 2002 after which the trial court bound Gardner over on both charges, and
Gardner entered pleas of not guilty (R. 294).
Prior to trial, Gardner, through counsel, filed a motion to dismiss on
grounds of entrapment (R. 59-68). A motion hearing was held on December 13,
2002 (R. 288). The trial court heard testimony in regards to the entrapment
motion. The trial court denied the motion to dismiss on grounds of entrapment (R.
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288: 107-110). On January 13, 2003, the court issued its written Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law and Order (R. 119-22).
A jury trial was held on February 26-28, 2003 after which the jury rendered
a verdict of guilty as to Count One (1) Distribution, Offering, Agreeing, Consent
or Arranging to Distribute a Controlled Substance (Methamphetamine), a second
degree felony; and a verdict of not guilty as to Count Two (2), Distribution,
Offering, Agreeing, Consent or Arranging to Distribute a Controlled Substance
(Heroin), a second degree felony (R. 279, 291: 402). At trial the jury was
instructed on the defense of entrapment (Jury Instructions nos. 32 and 33) (R. 21 L
212-13).
Gardner, who was incarcerated during the pendency of this case and trial,
was sentenced on April 22, 2003, to a consecutive term of one (1) to fifteen (15)
years in the Utah State Prison to the commitment he was already serving (R. 292).
Gardner is presently incarcerated at the Utah State Prison. The notice of appeal
was filed on April 28, 2003 (R. 281).
On appeal, Gardner filed a motion for summary7 reversal because the crossexamination portion of Leland Clark's testimony was not recorded. On March 23,
2005, the Court of Appeals denied the motion but remanded the matter to Third
District Court for a determination of whether the record could adequately be
reconstructed.
On September 30, 2004, the Third District Court held a hearing on
reconstructing the missing trial testimony (R. 298). The district court continued
3

the matter to allow counsel an opportunity to figure out the problem with the tapes
(R.298:4).
On November 9, 2004, a second reconstruction hearing was held in district
court (R. 297). At the hearing, defense counsel Wall stated that the missing
portion of the testimony was the most significant part because the defense was
attempting to establish at trial that there was an entrapment. Waifs perception was
that he fully and completely met all of the elements of an entrapment.
Wall further stated that during the cross-examination, he recalled the
witness stating that he had urged the defendant to engage in the unlawful conduct.
However, the prosecutor, Cope, recalled that the witness was given four words to
select from and that he selected the word "urge" (R. 297: 5). Wall submitted that
there would be an unclear record as to what in fact occurred at trial and whether or
not the elements were fully met (R. 297: 5).
Cope argued that Gardner was not prejudiced, because even if there was no
record of what the jury heard, the jury heard all the testimony and they deliberated
upon all the facts that were presented to them (R. 297: 11). Cope felt that he could
reconstruct Waifs cross-examination of the witness to a certain extent.
On December 21, 2004, a final reconstruction hearing was held in district
court (R. 296). The trial court concluded that with Cope's reconstruction using the
available testimony that the record could be satisfactorily reconstructed (R. 296:
5). The trial court further found that the defendant was not prejudiced by the
incomplete record (R. 296: 6).
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On January 26, 2006, the Utah Court of Appeals issued an unpublished, per
curiam decision affirming Gardner's convictions. The Court of Appeals
concluded that the record was complete enough to determine that the State
presented sufficient evidence for a jury to find that Gardner acted freely and
voluntarily, and was not entrapped into committing the offense. State v. Gardner,
not reported in P.3d, 2005 UT App 21, (Utah App. 2006) (included herein in the
Addenda; for easy reference paragraph numbers have been added to the copy of
the court of appeals' decision). The Court of Appeals also concluded, citing State
v. Russell, 917 P.2d 557, 559 (Utah App. 1996), that a defendant is not entitled to
a new trial whenever a gap in the record exists just in case the gap may contain
some error. Id. at1! 4.
Gardner filed a timely petition for writ of certiorari with this Court which
was ultimately granted. A copy of this Court's order granting that petition is
included in the Addenda.

STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS
A,

Testimony from the Jury Trial
1. Testimony of Leland Harris Clark
Clark, a fellow prisoner at the Utah State Prison and a friend of Gardner's,

testified that Gardner talked with him about bringing drugs into the prison through
a med tech friend of Gardner's (R. 289:109-111,115). Clark said that Gardner
told him that he had pills delivered to himself a couple of times but that he did not
5

have a connection who could supply the drugs and he couldn't talk the guy into
doing it (R. 289:115). Clark said he reported this information to investigator
Pepper "because it was against the law." (R. 289:114-1 16). Clark told Pepper that
the med tech friend worked in their section delivering medications and told Pepper
where he lived (R. 289:116).
Clark testified that he received instructions from investigator Pepper to
have Gardner call the phone number Pepper gave Clark, and tell Gardner that this
was the number of Clark's connection to get some drugs or have them brought in
(R. 289:118-119).
Clark testified he gave the number to Gardner, who called it using Clark's
prison PIN number, and then told Clark he talked to the connection about getting
cocaine and heroin and that he was excited about it, that it sounded like it was
going to be a good deal (R. 289:119-120). Clark told Gardner he would help him
sell (R. 289 at 120).
Clark also testified that Gardner told him after the phone call that he was
trying to get it lined up with the med tech to call Pepper as the connection and that
the med tech was on Gardner's prison calling list and that he had been calling him
(R. 289:121). Clark testified that he believed Gardner spoke with the med tech's
wife and that he was having a hard time persuading him, and it took him a couple
of times over a week or two to get things lined up (R. 289:121). Clark thought
Gardner made five or six calls total between investigator Pepper and the med tech
and/or his wife (R. 289:122).
6

Clark testified that Gardner told him the med teeh was poor and that it
probably would only be a one time thing if the med tech did it because he was
having money problems (R. 289:124). Clark stated Gardner told him that the med
tech was definitely scared but that he was interested, seeing it as a potential to
make some money (R. 289:124). Clark also said that he had no knowledge of the
med tech bringing in coke or heroin before, but only prescription drugs (R. 289:
124). Clark also testified that Gardner told him that the med tech and investigator
Pepper did talk on the phone at some point but that Clark was not sure who called
whom (R. 289:125).
2. Testimony of Donald Peter Buckley, Jr.
Buckley was employed at the Utah State Prison as a medic beginning in
October 2000 (R. 289:130-131). A couple months after beginning work, Buckley
ran across Randy (Shea) Gardner while doing the •'pill line," or dispensing
prescribed medications to the inmates (R. 289:130-131).
On February 18th Buckley believes, he received a call from Gardner after
working a 24 hour shift (R. 289:141). During said conversation, Buckley vaguely
remembers talk of a manila envelope (R. 289:142).
Later in the evening on February 18th, Buckley made a call to Gardner's
contact and asked him what the job was (R. 289:143). Buckley believed the
person's name was Kevin (R. 289 at 143). Kevin proceeded to tell him that it was
a delivery job, delivering drugs into the prison, specifically methamphetamine (R.

n
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289:143). Buckley told Kevin that he was not willing to risk his EMT
certification, his house, or his family to do that (R. 289:143).
When Buckley saw Gardner, during pill line, a day or two after the phone
call with Kevin, he basically told him the same thing - that there was no way
possible that he was going to put his job or family in jeopardy (R. 289:144).
3. Testimony of Kevin ML Pepper
In 2001, Kevin M. Pepper (Pepper) was working undercover at the Utah
State Prison on a case against Gardner and no other cases (R. 290:167). In late
2000, Pepper received word that Clark, a prisoner, wanted to see him (R. 290:16970). On January 10, 2001, after knowing Clark had wanted to see him for se\eral
weeks, Pepper met with Clark (R. 290:170-72). Clark wanted to discuss with
Pepper contraband coming into the prison and mentioned Gardner and an EMT
named Don who did the pill line (R. 290:171). Pepper instructed Clark to keep his
eyes and ears open while he attempted to verify some of the information Clark had
given him (R. 290:172).
During this initial conversation, Clark told Pepper that Don, the EMI, was
friends with Gardner and had been for some time, and that he was bringing
contraband into the prison (R. 290:175). Clark said that Gardner wanted to find a
source to get some dope to bring into the prison or have brought into the prison (R.
290:175).
On January 18th, 2001, Pepper had Clark transported off the property to
further inquire about the investigation and sign him up as an informant (R. 290:
8

181). During this meeting, Pepper instructed Clark about how he wanted the case
to proceed (R. 290:182). Specifically, he wanted Clark to provide to Gardner his
undercover name, Kevin Gilmore, and have Gardner contact him using Clark's
PIN number (R. 290:182). Pepper came up with this plan and these were the only
instructions given to Clark; they were never changed (R. 290:182, 184).
4. Testimony of Randy Shea Gardner
Gardner denied ever arranging or planning to bring controlled substances
into the prison on or about February 12th, 2001 (R. 291:281). On the 28th or 29th of
January, after hearing Gardner talking with his friend about the financial
devastation of med-tech Buckley, Clark asked Gardner if he thought his friend
would be interested in some help on how to get out of financial devastation (R.
291:282). Clark told Gardner that he had a friend who had numerous connections
to money through businesses or self money, who was pretty financially stable and
in a position to help other people through a loan or a possible job (R. 291:283).
Gardner asked Clark if he thought maybe his friend could make a loan or
recommend a job. Gardner thought maybe the guy had a salvage yard or
something like that for his friend to get a job (R. 291:283).
Clark then provided Gardner with the names of Kevin and Jackie Gilmore
and told him to have Buckley get a hold of them or pass his phone number to
Buckley or Buckley's phone number to Kevin (R. 291:283).
Gardner then wrote a letter to Buckley to tell him of a possible way for him
to get out of financial devastation and that he would get ahold of him in the future
9

and pass the information along (R. 291:284). After Gardner wrote the first letter,
he talked to Clark who gave him Kevin's phone number and an address (R. 291:
284). Gardner then wrote to Buckley to give him the number and address (R. 291 :
284).
On February 12lh, Clark provided Gardner with his inmate PIN number on a
piece of paper as well as Kevin's home phone number and Gardner went to the
phone to call him (R. 291:285). After the phone call Gardner went and talked to
Clark for a few minutes and then went to take a shower (R. 291:285). Gardner
said he called Kevin to find out his information and to give him Buckley's phone
number so they could get together to talk about the job (R. 291:285). Gardner
stated that during the conversation with Kevin things went "a little out of the way I
thought they were going to go" (R. 291:285). Kevin started talking about other
stuff other than the job (R. 291:285). During this conversation, Gardner went
along with the comments Kevin was making because Clark had told him that his
friend was the kind of person they really wanted to keep happy, appease him, so
Gardner construed that to mean Kevin was important or somebody that has
influence somewhere (R. 291:286). Gardner went to talk to Clark about it and
Clark told him, wThis is something that me and Kevin are doing on the side. It has
nothing to do with you. I'll talk to him and leave you out of further conversation
like this" (R. 291:285).
Gardner also talked to Buckley about contacting this Kevin and told
Buckley he wasn't really sure what it was about but that u to my knowledge,
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there's going to be a manila envelope with some money involved" (R. 291:288).
In response to why he said that, Gardner stated, "Leiand (Clark) Irad - Leiand had
brought up a manila envelope to me along the lines of when we were talking. I
went and asked him about ounces and black and white. And I had brought up in
the manila envelope in a conversation earlier, when I had spoke with Kevin and
Leiand had told me, Just tell him to use a manila envelope" (R. 291:288). Gardner
wasn't sure how this manila envelope was going to be involved (R. 291:289).
Gardner was concerned about what would happen if he did something
contrary to the circumstances that Clark and Kevin put him in (R. 291:290). He
was afraid due to Kevin's comments about not wanting him to get in trouble, or
his "ass in a jam" and the recent stabbing and having been jumped at the prison
once before and perhaps someone having friends to retaliate against him (R. 291:
290-91).
Gardner then talked to Clark, and told him he had just talked to Buckley,
and reminded him again to get ahold of Kevin (R. 291:291). During the phone
conversations, Kevin's mention of his plans to go to New York gave Gardner the
impression that Kevin was some big shot who had connections in New York and
made him want to placate him a little more (R. 291:292). Gardner also got the
impression not that Kevin was trying to impress him, but that he was trying to let
him know, "Don't screw me over" (R. 291:293).
Gardner testified that Clark asked him almost daily about whether he had
received a response from Buckley and that as the time passed with no response
11

from Buckley that Clark became more agitated, more irritable towards Gardner,
and they went from hanging out every day to Clark only talking to him once in a
great while, that Clark started avoiding him (R. 291:303). Gardner stated that
Clark's language changed from pleasant conversation to more aggressive and
hostile, emphasizing the need to get ahold of Buckley and get it taken care of (R.
291:303).

B.

Testimony from the Motion Hearing regarding Entrapment
1- Testimony of Leland Harris Clark ("Jazzman")
Clark is an inmate at the Utah Department of Corrections and was an

inmate in February of 2001 (R. 288:25). Clark has known Kevin Pepper since
August of 2000 (R. 288:25). During the latter part of January, 2001, Clark gave
information to Pepper about a somewhat close friend of Gardner who was a niedtech and was bringing dope in and could bring dope in (R. 288:27). Clark testified
that initially he got information from his own observations of things going on in
the prison, then he nosed around and eventually Gardner told him what was going
on (R. 288:27). Clark testified that Gardner told him that it started when Gardner
and his cell-mate were getting pills from the med-tech, because the med-tcch's
wife was like Gardner's sister - they grew up together (R. 288:27).
Clark testified that Gardner told him about things that had already
happened and things that were going on right then (R. 288:27). Clark testified that
he shared all of this information with Pepper (R. 288:28). Clark testified that
12

Pepper instructed him to keep him posted and let him know what was going on
and if Gardner had anything planned and what was going to come in (R. 288:28).
In exchange for this information, Clark proposed that Pepper provide him with a
letter to the Board of Pardons for consideration and a transfer to another facility
(R. 288:28). Clark also required "[hjousing ... and a time cur (R. 288:28).
Clark testified that from the end of January until the end of February he
talked to Pepper close to ten or fifteen times about things he had heard or things
that he knew from Gardner (R. 288:28). During the same timeframe, he talked to
Gardner every day - they were out on the same recreation schedule and li\ ed two
or three cells from each other (R. 288:29).
Clark testified that Gardner said that "he didn't have any connections as far
as drugs, you know, but he'd like to get some lined up because, you know, if we
could work something out as a partnership, if I could get the dope lined up, he
could - he could have it brought in and we both could make some good money"
(R. 288:29). Clark indicated to Gardner that he could do that (R. 288:29). Clark
then talked to Pepper about it and they planned to have Clark give Pepper's phone
number to Gardner as Clark's drug connection (R. 288:30). Clark did not tell
Gardner that his "connection" worked for the Utah State Prison system. Instead he
let him believe that Pepper was his connection for drugs on the streets and that he
wanted to get something into the prison to make some money himself (R. 288:30).
Clark testified that he did not recall making any specific promises to
Gardner about how much money he could make or how lucrative it was to do this,
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he just remembered that the partnership was 50-50 (R. 288:30). Clark testified
that he talked to Gardner about how much money it was possible to make in such
an endeavor, but he did not recall the numbers (R. 288:31).
Clark was asked if he urged, encouraged, or pressured Gardner to
participate in this enterprise and Clark answered that he urged him. Clark told
Gardner that he could make him some money, too. Gardner told Clark that the
med-tech was about to lose his house and he wanted to do it one or two times
because he wanted to do something to help him (R. 288:31). Gardner also told
Clark that he wanted to transfer out-of-state, possibly to Washington. Clark told
him he wanted to get some money for transfer, too (R. 288:31).
Clark testified that Gardner reported to him several times about the
conversations he had with Pepper. Gardner indicated that it sounded good and that
he was going to work try to put him in touch with the med-tech (R. 288:32).
Clark's impression was that Gardner was enthusiastic about the prospects
(R. 288:32). Clark never indicated to Gardner that any negative things would
happen if he did not go through with the deal (R. 288:32). Clark testified that both
he and Gardner were nervous about selling dope inside prison (R. 288:32). Both
of their fears centered around getting caught (R. 288:33).
Clark recalled that the last time he spoke to Gardner about the enterprise
was in February of 2001 (R. 288:33). Clark was transferred at the end of February
and the last conversation with Gardner took place within a day or the same day of
the transfer (R. 288:33). During the last conversation with Gardner, Clark testified
14

that they talked about "trying to get it lined up or he was - Mr. Pepper was calling
the med-tech on the street, was supposed to line that up - could talk to the - or Mr.
Gardner talk to the med-tech and told him that my connection was going to call
him and talk to him and line things upv (R. 288:34). Clark testified that the name
of the med-tech was uDon" (R. 288:34) and he saw "Don" five days a week when
he came into their section and delivered pills (R. 288:34).
Clark testified that he had first been sentenced to prison in 1989 for writing
bad checks or fraud. Clark admitted that fraud is lying. Clark testified that he had
been in prison probably eight years since 1989, but that it wasn't continuous (R.
288:35). Clark testified that he was sentenced in January of 1999 for attempted
security fraud and that is why he was in prison in February of 2001(R. 288:35).
Clark wanted to be transferred out of state because he knew that this enterprise
was going to have some ramifications and being in the population would be a little
rough (R. 288:37).
At the time, Clark was not talking to Pepper about any other inmates (R.
288:37). Clark did not recall intercepting and delivering to Pepper "kites"' from
any prisoner other than Gardner (R. 288:37). Clark did not remember the specific
month that he began being housed with Gardner, just that it had been some time
the previous year (R. 288:37). Clark agreed that the dates September of 1999 to
January 5, 2001 were about right (R. 288:38). Clark testified that Gardner went to
another unit to live for a while and then he came back within a month of this
incident (R. 288:38).
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Clark testified that he had been talking with Pepper regarding Gardner prior
to the time that Gardner was taken out of the unit and it was during that time that
he became aware of the relationship between Gardner and Buckley, the med-lech.
Clark informed Pepper of the relationship and that Buckley was giving contraband
material to Gardner prior to leaving the unit in January (R. 288:39). Clark did not
observe the transfer of contraband, he was told about it from Gardner (R. 288:40).
Clark testified that a "kite" is a slip of paper passed between prisoners
facilitating communication. Clark testified that he did not recall intercepting any
"kites" from Gardner, but he did receive some "kites" from Gardner and passed
them on to Pepper (R. 288:40). Clark testified that he understood after his
conversation with Pepper about the benefits he wanted to receive that he would
need to provide further information to Pepper in order to get all of the benefits he
wanted (R. 288:41).
Clark had discussions with Gardner, prior to his removal in January of
2001, about his relationship with Buckley (R. 288:41). Clark was aware of the
close relationship between Gardner and Buckley's wife from January of 2000 to
the time that Gardner was removed from the unit in January of 2001 (R. 288:42).
Clark knew that the close relationship had gone on for many years and that the
Buckley family was having economic difficulty, could not meet his monthly bills,
and was considering bankruptcy (R. 288:42). Clark knew from his conversations
with Gardner that Gardner was very concerned about Buckley's situation (R.
288:43). Clark did not know that Gardner had a girlfriend (R. 288:43).
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Clark testified that some time in January of 2001, Gardner was removed for
a short period of time from the unit he was in with Clark. Gardner was then
returned to the unit. When he returned, Clark was aware that arrangements were
going to be made through Pepper for telephone calls to be made (R. 288:45).
Clark testified that it is his understanding that prison officials determine where
people live in the units of the Utah State Prison and it was through the prison
officials that Gardner was returned to the same unit Clark was in (R. 288:46).
Clark knew that his conversations with Pepper were tape recorded, but he never
saw any written reports that Pepper had made about their conversations (R.
288:46). The conversations occurred on the unit phone and Clark was aware that
the unit phones could be recorded (R. 288:47).
Clark urged Gardner to get involved in this arrangement with Pepper (R.
288:47).
Clark stated that Gardner came to him excited about making money and he
just encouraged him and told him it would be great. They talked about it every
day - the kind of money there was to make, their connection for the drugs, and
somebody to bring it in (R. 288:48). Clark had to tell Gardner that Pepper was
available in order to make the money and Clark initiated the conversation with
Gardner about "Kevin" being out there to provide money. Clark referred to
"Kevin" as a Mr. Moneybags and indicated that this person was worth millions of
dollars and was "extremely well-heeled" (R. 288:48). Clark indicated to Gardner
that "Kevin" could give him a job whereby he could make a lot of money. Clark
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then used the information he had about Gardner's relationship with Buckley's wife
and their bankruptcy situation to develop an avenue whereby this whole
transaction could occur (R. 288:50).
Clark provided Gardner with the telephone number for '"Kevin" after Clark
and Pepper had actually talked about how the particular structure for this
transaction would be put in place (R. 288:51).
For his participation, Clark was transferred out of state and he received a
letter to the Board and is just waiting for some court proceedings to get his time
cut (R. 288:51). Clark's current release date is June of 2006. Clark has been
convicted of over 10 felonies. Not all the convictions are fraud. His convictions
include bad checks, theft burglary, embezzlement (R. 288:52).
Clark had never spoken to Deputy District Attorney Cope prior to this
hearing and all of his communication about this case had been with Pepper. Clark
never had any contact with Buckley about this deal. Clark reported to Pepper
what Gardner told him and he never exaggerated, embellished, or made up details
(R. 288:54).

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution, which protect
individuals from any governmental deprivation of life, liberty, or property with the
due process of law, applies to the appellate process. Because Utah has passed
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legislation regarding the recording of criminal proceedings, it is bound to apply
that legislation in accordance with the requirements of due process.
While a complete, verbatim record of all court proceedings may not be
compulsory, decisions from the United States Supreme Court as well as this Court
imply that it must be a record of sufficient completeness to permit proper
consideration of the appellant's claims.
Where, as here, the cross-examination testimony of the witness most
critical to the establishment of a defendant's affirmative defense is not recorded,
fundamental fairness demands that a defendant not be required to pursue his
appeal while hobbled by an incomplete record.
Due process is a flexible concept based on the concept of fairness, and
"should afford the 'procedural protections that the given situation demands/"
Low v. City ofMonticello, 2004 UT 90, f 15, 103 P.3d 130, 134 (Utah 2004)
(citations omitted). Because Gardner's claims of trial error cannot be adequately
reviewed without Clark's cross-examination testimony, fundamental fairness and
due process demands that he be granted a new trial.
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ARGUMENT
Due Process Requires That Gardner Be Granted A New Trial Where The
Recorded Transcript Does Not Include The Cross-Examination Testimony Of
The Critical Witness To Gardner's Entrapment Defense, Because Gardner
Was Deprived Of His Constitutional Right To Meaningful Appellate Review

Notions of fundamental fairness are protected by the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments, which "prohibit[] any state deprivation of life, liberty, or property
without due process of law." Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 48 K 92 S.Ct.
2593, 2600 (1972). The United States Supreme Court has applied this guarantee
under a two-step analysis, addressing first "whether the asserted individual
interests are encompassed within the Fourteenth Amendment's protection ol iife,
liberty or property," and second "what procedures constitute cdue process of
law.'" Id.
Here, the individual interest concerned is that most basic American
concept, liberty - specifically, the deprivation thereof consequent to a criminal
conviction. Thus, the question before this Court requires a determination of those
procedures due a criminal defendant in pursuing an appellate review of his
conviction when part of the trial transcript is missing.
The United States Supreme Court has determined that the guarantee of due
process extends to the appellate process. See Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 392,
105 S.Ct 830, 834, 83 L.Ed.2d 821 (1985) (Where "a State has created appellate
courts as 'an integral part of the ... system for finally adjudicating the guilt or
20

innocence of a defendant," ... the procedures used in deciding appeals must
comport with the demands of the Due Process and Rqual Protection Clauses of the
Constitution," quoting Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 1 8, 76 S.Ct. 585, 590, 100
L.Bd. 891 (1956)).
The district courts of Utah are courts of record. Utah Const, art. VI IK §1;
Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-l-l(l),(2), 78-1-2 (1987). As such, a record of all its
official proceedings are to be made. Utah Code Ann. § 78-56-105 (1997) {see
Addenda). Judges "are required to make a record of the proceedings they
conduct. Ordinarily, the record consists of a verbatim transcription or recording of
the entire proceeding:" Liska v. Liska, 902 P.2d 644. 649 (Utah App. 1995)
(emphasis added). Having established a statutory requirement for ihe recording
of court proceedings, Utah courts should be bound to apply that requirement
fairly and uniformly. While a verbatim record may not be required, it should be
"a 'record of sufficient completeness' to permit proper consideration of

the

appellant's claims." Mayer v. City of Chicago, 404 U.S. 189, 193, 92 S.Ct. 410,
414, 30 L.Ed.2d 372 (1971), quoting Draper v. Washington, 372 U.S 487. 496,
83 S.Ct. 774, 779, 9 L.Ed.2d 899 (1963). "Generally, a record is adequate if it
permits appellate review" Liska, supra, 902 P.2d at 649 fn. 6 (emphasis added).
While the focus of the Supreme Court's decisions cited above addressed
providing transcripts to indigent appellants, the language used is at least
instructive. In Griffin, for example, a decision on the merits of the appeal was
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necessarily dependent upon a sufficient transcript of the trial court proceedings.
See 351 U.S. at 13-14, 76 S.Ct. at 588.
Utah cases that have approached the issue presented by the instant case
include State v. Tunzi, 2000 UT 38, 998 P.2d 816 (Utah 2000) and State v. Taylor,
664 P.2d 439 (Utah 1983). In the former, the videotape of the second day of the
defendant's trial could not be located and was therefore not transcribed for the
record. Tunzi, 998 P.2d at f2, 817. This Court ordered a new trial, observing that
'"attempts to reconstruct major portions of records often prove to be futile because
such reconstructions often fail to provide the detail necessary to resolve the issues
on appeal. The burdens and futility associated with reconstructing a record are
increased exponentially when the issue on appeal concerns the sufficiency of the
evidence supporting a conviction, as it does here." Id. at ^3.
Similarly, in Taylor, this Court ordered a new trial in a case challenging the
adequacy of the trial court's jury voir dire because the audiotaped questioning had
a number of inaudible responses. Taylor. 664 P.2d at 445-447, In so ordering,
this Court noted that it could not assume what the jurors" answers showed when
they were "totally absent from the record and c[ould] not be reconstructed by
agreement of the parties." Id. at 447.
While neither Tunzi nor Taylor addressed the due process implications of
an incomplete or inadequate record, this Court nevertheless implied that a
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meaningful appeal could not be accomplished absent a record that sufficiently
memorialized the issue presented.
This Court has also found plain error when a trial court fails to enter
statutorily mandated written findings, reasoning that "only when such steps are
taken can this Court properly perform its appellate review function." State v.
Labrum, 925 P.2d 937, 940 (Utah 1996), quoting State v. Nelson, 725 P.2d 1353,
1356 n. 3 (Utah 1986); see also State v. Eldredge, 113 P.2d 29, 35 (Utah), cert
denied, 493 U.S. 814, 110 S.Ct. 62, 107 L.Ed.2d (1989); State v. Matsamas, 808
P.2d 1048, 1051 (Utah 1991). Again, implicit in this line of cases is the
assumption that a meaningful appeal can only be accomplished with enough of a
record to review the appellant's claims.
Utah's Court of Appeals has explicitly held that the government's
"improper recording and maintenance of the ... record is a due process violation in
that it deprived [appellants] of their right to a meaningful review." West Valley
City v.Roberts, 1999 UT App. 358, f7, 993 P.2d 252, 255 (Utah App. 1999)
(audiotape malfunction at housing code hearing necessitated a new hearing,
despite presence of documentary evidence). In another case, an equipment
malfunction resulted in a failure to record almost two hours of the appellant's
criminal trial. State v. Russell, 917 P.2d 557, 558 (Utah App. 1996). Though the
Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction with the observation that Taylor "does
not require a complete record so appellate counsel can go fishing for error; it only
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requires that there be a record adequate to review specific claims of error already
raised," Russell, 917 P.2d at 559, the court found the case to be "troubling":
It seems unfair that the great majority of convicted
defendants have the luxury of searching the record for error,
while an unfortunate few who encounter equipment snafus or
lost reporter's notes must rely only upon the memories and
notes of those present to reconstruct what happened and what
errors might have been made. Additionally, this rule ma> tend
to promote disingenuousness on the part of appellate counsel.
Case law suggests if there are numerous alleged mistakes, a
new trial must be held unless the entire record can be
satisfactorily reconstructed.
Id. at 559, n. 1. Yet, despite its professed concern with "the unfortunate
few who encounter equipment snafus," Id., the Court of Appeals in this case did
not even consider the attempted reconstruction it had ordered. The Court of
Appeals, in affirming Gardner's conviction, found that 4wthe record on appeal is
complete enough to determine whether Gardner freely and voluntarily committed
the acts in question because the State's case-in-chief is complete and the missing
testimony would, at most, be inconsistent or contrary evidence." State v. Gardner,
2005 UT App 21,^5. This conclusion begs the question: despite the
"completeness" of the State's case against Gardner, the entrapment defense is a
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factor tending to raise a reasonable doubt that the defendant freely and voluntarily
committed the offense charged. See State v. Curtis, 542 P.2d 744, 746 (Utah
1975) ("the only requirement on the defense of entrapment is that it be sufficient
to raise a reasonable doubt that the defendant freely and voluntarily committed the
crime").
Because Gardner's entrapment defense relied heavily on Clark's testimony
and because Gardner's trial counsel perceived that he had elicited testimony
establishing entrapment on cross-examination (R. 304-305), a review of Clark's
cross-examination was critical to a fair determination of issues presented by
Gardner's appeal. This is especially so where defense counsel observed that the
trial had produced "additional evidence that was not heard at the motion hearing"
on the entrapment issue (R. 290:280). Again, the Court of Appeals could not have
meaningfully reviewed the sufficiency of the evidence or the correctness of the
trial court's denial of the motion for a directed verdict absent the primary evidence
introduced on entrapment. In completely disregarding the import of Clark's crossexamination testimony, the Court of Appeals effectively reduced Gardner's
constitutional right to confront the witnesses against him to a mere formality.
Other states have considered and determined that a sufficiently complete
record is necessary to a meaningful appellate review. See, e g., People of the State
of Colorado v. Killpack, 793 P.2d 642, 643 (Colo.App. 1990) ("When testimony
this crucial [addressing defendant's mental state] is in dispute and the precise
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language used is critical, reconstruction is not an appropriate remedy for the
missing transcript. ...While we agree that loss of a portion of the complete trial
record does not automatically require reversal, nonetheless, when a defendant can
show that the incomplete record "visits a hardship upon [the appellant] and
prejudices his appeal" reversal is proper," internal citation omitted); People of the
State of New York v. Hussari, 17 A.D.3d 483, 794 N.Y.S.2d 64 (NY 2005)
("When fca record cannot be reconstructed because of the lapse of time, the
unavailability of the participants in the proceeding or some similar circumstance,
there must be a reversal,'" internal citations omitted); State ofLoasiana v.
AmbeaiL 930 So.2d 54, 59 (La.App. 4 Cir. 2006)CvMaterial omissions from the
transcript of the proceedings at trial bearing on the merits of an appeal require
reversal"); State of North Carolina v. Sanders, 312 N.C. 318, 320. 321 S.E.2d 836
(N.C. 1984) (because "meaningful appellate review of the serious questions
presented by defendant's appeal is completely precluded by the entirely inaccurate
and inadequate transcription of the trial proceedings and that no adequate record
can be formulated," judgment is vacated and new trial ordered); State of
Washington v. Thomas, 70 Wn.App. 296, 298, 852 P.2d 1130 (1993); United
States v. Brown-Austin, 34 M.J. 578, 582 (ACMR 1992) (while a "verbatim
transcript is not constitutionally required for appellate review, ... [tjhe government
has the burden of rebutting the presumption of prejudice which results when there
is substantial omission from the record").
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In the instant case, the State's key witness and confidential informant,
Leland Clark, was cross-examined at trial regarding his status as an agent for the
government; his formulation, with Officer Pepper, of a plan to bring drugs into the
prison, which he then "urged" Gardner to follow, and Gardner's close living
proximity to Clark during this sequence of events (R. 304-305). Gardner's trial
counsel also offered the observation that Clark's testimony differed notably from
the pretrial evidentiary hearing (R. 304-305). Defense counsel's memory of this
cross-examination contrasts significantly from that of the prosecutor (R. 300-302).
This cross-examination testimony went unrecorded and therefore was not
transcribed (289:127). Because this testimony, if it occurred as defense counsel
remembered it, would have established the defense of entrapment, there can be no
meaningful review of Gardner's claims regarding the sufficiency of the evidence
against him, the denial of his motion to dismiss on grounds of entrapment, or the
correctness of the jury instructions given regarding entrapment.
Due process, a flexible concept "based on the concept of fairness, should
afford the 'procedural protections that the given situation demands.5" Low, supra,
2004 UT 90 at \\5 (citations omitted). Because Gardner's claims of trial error
cannot be adequately reviewed without Clark's cross-examination testimony,
Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-303 provides: "It is a defense that the actor was
entrapped into committing the offense. Entrapment occurs when a peace officer or
a person directed by or acting in cooperation with the officer induces the
commission of an offense in order to obtain evidence of the commission for
prosecution by methods creating a substantial risk that the offense would be
committed by one not otherwise ready to commit it. Conduct merely affording a
person an opportunity to commit an offense does not constitute entrapment."
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fundamental fairness and due process demands that he be granted a new trial.
This is particularly true where his constitutional rights to confrontation are
likewise implicated. Accordingly, because this Court cannot conclude that the
absence of the critical cross-examination testimony from the record is harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt to meaningful and necessary appellate review, this
Court should reverse Gardner's conviction. Harrington v. California, 395 U.S.
250, 254, 89 S.Ct. 1726, 1728, 23 L.Ed.2d 284 (1969); Schneble v. Florida, 405
U.S. 427, 430, 92 S.Ct. 1056, 1058,31 L.Ed.2d 340 (1912); see also Chapman v.
California, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967); State v. Hartford,
737 P.2d 200, 204 (Utah 1987).

CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT
Because Gardner was deprived meaningful appellate review due to the
absence of that testimony most critical to Gardner's entrapment defense, clue
process requires that this Court reverse his conviction and remand this matter to
the Third District Court for a new trial.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 18th day of September, 2006,

Julia Thomas
Margaret Lindsay
Counsel for Appellant
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I hereby certify that I delivered lour (4) true and correct copies of the
foregoing Brief of Appellant to the Utah Attorney General, 160 East 300 South,
Sixth Floor, P.O. Box 140854, Salt Lake City, UT 84114, this 18,h day of
September, 2006.
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ADDENDA
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Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-303: It is a defense that the actor was entrapped into
committing the offense. Entrapment occurs when a peace officer or a person
directed by or acting in cooperation with the officer induces the commission of an
offense in order to obtain evidence of the commission for prosecution by methods
creating a substantial risk that the offense would be committed by one not
otherwise ready to commit it. Conduct merely affording a person an opportunity
to commit an offense does not constitute entrapment.
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Utah Code Ann. § 78-56-105: Record of court proceedings-Duties of court
reporter
(1) The Judicial Council shall by rule provide for the means of maintaining
the record of proceedings in the courts of record by official court reporters
or by electronic recording devices.
(2) The official court reporter assigned to a session of court shall take full
verbatim stenographic notes of the session, except when the judge
dispenses with the verbatim record.
(3) The official court reporter shall immediately file with the clerk of the
court the original stenographic notes of the court session and the computer
disk on which the notes are stored. If not already on file with the clerk of
the court, the official court reporter shall file a computer disk containing the
reporters most current dictionary showing the meaning of the reporter's
stenographic notes.
(4) Upon request and the payment of fees established by Section 78-56-108,
the official court reporter shall transcribe the stenographic notes or video or
audio recording of the court session and furnish the transcript to the
requesting party.
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MEMORANDUM DECISION (Not For Official
Publication)
PER CURIAM:
*1 Randy Shea Gardner appeals his conviction of
arranging for the distribution of a controlled
substance. He asserts that his conviction should be
reversed and the case remanded for a new trial
because the record is insufficient for a meaningful
appeal. He also argues that a jury instruction was in
error.
Criminal defendants have the right to a "record of
sufficient
completeness
to
permit
proper
consideration of [their] claims." State v. Menzies,
845 P.2d 220, 241 (Utah 1992) (internal quotations
and citation omitted). They do not, however, have a
right to a perfect transcript. See id. Rather, the
record must be adequate to allow meaningful
judicial review. See id.
"Due process requires that there be a record

adequate to review specific claims of error already
raised." West Valley City v. Roberts, 1999 UT App
358, H II, 993 P.2d 252 (internal quotations and
citation omitted). Appellate courts will not presume
error where a record is incomplete. See id. A lack of
a complete record will be a "basis for remand and a
new hearing only where: (I) the absence or
incompleteness of the record prejudices the
appellant; (2) the record cannot be satisfactorily
reconstructed (i.e., by affidavits
or other
documentary evidence); and, (3) the appellant
timely requests the relevant portion of the record.11
Id
A y An incomplete record may necessitate a new trial
*
where a defendant shows that a specific error is
asserted and that the missing record was critical to
its resolution. See State v Russell, 917 P.2d 557,
559 (Utah Ct.App.1996). A defendant is not entitled
to a new trial whenever there is a gap in the record, "
just in case the missing record might reveal some
error." Id. Rather, a showing of prejudice is
required. See id. Gardner has not shown that the gap
in the record has prejudiced him.
I^£- Gardner asserts that the record on appeal is
inadequate to determine whether there was
sufficient evidence to support his conviction. He
argues that the absence of the cross-examination
testimony of Leland Clark means that this court
cannot review whether there was sufficient evidence
to show the "lack of entrapment." However, the
record on appeal is complete enough to determine
whether Gardner freely and voluntarily committed
the acts in question because the State's case-in-chief
is complete and the missing testimony would, at
most, be inconsistent or contrary evidence.
&(z A conviction may be overturned for insufficiency of
evidence only "when it is apparent that there is not
sufficient competent evidence as to each element of
the crime charged for the fact-finder to find, beyond
a reasonable doubt, that the defendant committed
the crime." State v Boyd, 2001 UT 30, f 13, 25
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Moreover, "li]t is the exclusive function of the jury
to weigh the evidence and to determine the
credibility of the witnesses." Id. at f 16. "When
reviewing a trial wherein conflicting competent
evidence was presented, we simply "assume that the
jury believed the evidence supporting the verdict." '
Id. at U 14 (quoting State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201,
1213 (Utah 1993)). Ultimately, in determining the
sufficiency of the evidence, "so long as there is
some evidence, including reasonable inferences,
from which findings of all the requisite elements of
the crime can reasonably be made, our inquiry stops.
" M a t ^ 16.
*2 The record is complete enough to determine that
the State presented sufficient evidence for a jury to
find that Gardner acted freely and voluntarily, and
was not entrapped into committing the offense. The
evidence showed that Gardner initiated the plan of
bringing drugs into the prison, lacking only an
outside supplier. Gardner demonstrated his
willingness to participate in this enterprise. Kevin
Pepper provided Gardner the opportunity to commit
the offense by posing as an outside supplier, with
Clark passing on certain contact information to
Gardner. The phone conversations between Gardner
and Pepper show no hesitation or confusion from
Gardner in participating in a drug distribution
agreement.
Even assuming that Clark's cross-examination
testimony supported Gardner's defense that he was
entrapped into committing the offense due to
concern for his own safety and concern for a
friend's financial circumstances, the testimony
would present only inconsistent evidence, which the
jury obviously chose not to believe. There is
testimony from Clark stating that Gardner initiated
the idea of bringing drugs into prison, and
testimony from Pepper regarding the further
arrangements. Where conflicting evidence is
presented at trial, appellate courts "simply assume
that the jury believed the evidence supporting the
verdict." Id. at Tj 14 (internal quotations and
citation omitted). Given the evidence supporting the
verdict, the presumption is that the jury simply did
not give any significant weight to any possible
testimony from Clark that would have supported

entrapment. As a result, Gardner has not shown any
prejudice due to the missing portion of the record.

**1

Gardner also argues that the missing testimony is
necessary to identify any other possible errors at
trial. However, a defendant is not entitled to a new
trial whenever a gap in the record exists just in case
the gap ma) contain some error. See State v. Russell,
917 P.2d 557. 559 (Utah Ct.App.1996). Gardner
overstates Russell as mandating teversal where a
record is incomplete. In fact, Russell held that an
incomplete record does not on its own require a new
trial. See id. The court noted that Utah law "does
not require a complete record so appellate counsel
can go fishing for error; it only requires that there
be a record adequate to review specific claims of
error already raised." Id.

4io

Gardner also asserts that the trial court erred in
giving an instruction regarding the elements of
entrapment. When challenging jur\ instructions on
appeal, an appellant "cannot take advantage of an
error committed at trial when that [appellant] led
the trial court into committing the error" State v
Geukgeuzian, 2004 UT 16, % 9, 86 P.3d 742
(quotations and citation omitted). As a result, a jury
instruction ma\ not be assigned as error " 'if
counsel, either by statement or act, affirmatively
represented to the court that he or she had no
objection to the jury instruction/' * Id (quoting
State v. Hamilton, 2003 UT 22, <[| 54, 70 P.3d 111).
Counsel affirmatively represented to the trial court
that he had no objection to the specific instruction
now appealed. Thus, Gardner is precluded from
challenging this instruction on appeal.
*3 Accordingly, Gardner's conviction is affirmed.
Utah App.,2006.
State v. Gardner
Not Reported in P.3d, 2006 WL 181520 (Utah
App.), 2005 UTApp21
END OF DOCUMENT
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Randy She i o a r a r i e r ,
Defendant and P e t i t i o n e r .

ORDER

This matter is before the court upon a Petition i;"ox writ o.l
certiorari, filed on March 27, 2006,
T 18 HEREBY ORDERED, pursuant to RUJ
of Appellate Procedure, the Petition
>r w
trained as to the foiiowinq issue:

tiorari

Whether due process necessitated review of the crossexamination testimony of one of the State's witness, where
Petitioner claimed entrapment, the recorded transcript does not
include the cross-examination testimony, and the court of appeals
did not address the district court's proposed reconstruction of
that testimony.
.
A briefing schedule will be established hereofter. Pursuant
to rule 2, the court suspends the provision of rule 26(a) that
permits the parties to stipulate to an extension of time to
submit their briefs on the merits. The parties shall not be
permitted to stipulate to an extension. Additionally, absent
extraordinary circumstances, no extensions will be granted by
motion. The parties shall comply with the briefing schedule upon
11s issuance.
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